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ABSTRACT
Nowadays,  the  IP  Multimedia  Subsystem (IMS)  is  a  promising  research  field.  Many ongoing  works  
related to the security and the performances of its employment are presented to the research community.  
Although, the security and data privacy aspects are very important in the IMS global objectives, they  
observe little attention so far. Secure access to multimedia services is based on SIP and HTTP digest on 
top of  IMS architecture.  The  standard deploys  AKA-MD5 for  the  terminal  authentication.  The  third 
Generation  Partnership  Project  (3GPP)  provided  Generic  Bootstrapping  Architecture  (GBA)  to  
authenticate the subscriber before accessing multimedia services over HTTP. In this paper, we propose a  
new IMS Service Authentication scheme using Identity Based cryptography (IBC). This new scheme will  
lead to better performances when there are simultaneous authentication requests using Identity-based  
Batch  Verification.  We  analyzed  the  security  of  our  new protocol  and  we presented  a  performance  
evaluation of its cryptographic operations. 
KEYWORDS
IP  Multimedia  Subsystem  (IMS),  Identity  Based  Cryptography  (IBC),  Service  Authentication,  Batch  
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1. INTRODUCTION
The IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) [1], is an architectural framework for delivering Internet 
Protocol (IP) multimedia services. It was originally designed by the wireless standards body 3rd 
Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), as a part of the vision for evolving mobile networks 
beyond  Global  System for  Mobile  Communications (GSM).  The  IMS provides  multimedia 
services (such as Voice over IP (VoIP), video conferencing, presence, push-to-talk etc.) on top 
of all IP networks as well as NGN (Next Generation Networks). 
IMS provides a unique architecture for authentication and accounting of different services. Each 
subscriber uses an ISIM (IMS-SIM) card with a stored secret key to be able to authenticate to 
the IMS network and to be able to access the IMS services. One requirement provided in IMS, 
is the tight attachment of the subscriber authentication to the User Equipment  UE since the 
ISIM card participates in the Authentication and key Agreement (AKA) [2]. Therefore, the keys 
are  not  generated from the user Identity but  are  randomly chosen by the  Home  Subscriber 
Server (HSS).
Consequently,  IMS  authentication  falls  short  in  one  hand  to  realize  authentication  in  a 
personalized manner, which is an important prerequisite in new services such as social internet 
ones.  Moreover,  using  AKA  in  IMS  proved  to  have  some  weakness,  like  short  key  for 
cryptographic purposes [3], [4]. Many solutions are provided to strengthen IMS security. Wu et 
al [5] define a new AKA based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and Huang et al [6] 
define a new AKA called one pass AKA for UMTS. Furthermore, Ring et al [7] tried to design 
1
International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA), Vol.1, No.3, October 2009
a new AKA mechanism for Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) using Identity Based Cryptography 
(IBC) [8]. However, these works were only done for the subscriber authentication with nothing 
special on service authentication. 
In this paper, we propose a new authentication scheme for services authentication in IMS. Our 
proposed  scheme  is  an  Identity  based  authentication  type  which  in  turn  allows  users’ 
identification  with  a  certain  sort  of  personalization.  The  key  advantage  of  IBC  lies  in  its 
simplicity and robustness. Moreover, our solution proposes an Identity based batch verification 
which  will  decrease  the  verification  time  for  simultaneous  clients  requesting  service 
authentication.
The  remainder  of  this  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  Section  2  describes  the  IMS service 
authentication process. Section 3 gives an overview on the IBC mechanism. In Section 4, we 
present our novel solution, and in Sections 5, we analyse its security. In Section 6, we briefly 
discuss the performance analysis that we carried out and we conclude the paper in Section 7.
2. OVERVIEW ON IMS SERVICE AUTHENTICATION 
Third  Generation  Partnership  Project  (3GPP)  has  provided  the  bootstrapping  of  application 
security to authenticate the subscriber by defining a Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) 
[9]  based on Authentication and Key Agreement  (AKA) protocol.  The GBA model  can be 
utilized to authenticate subscriber before accessing multimedia services and applications over 
HTTP. The GBA consists of five entities [10]:
• The UE (User Equipment): is a UICC (Universal Integrated Circuit Card) containing USIM 
or  ISIM  related  information  that  supports  HTTP  Digest  AKA  (Authentication  &  Key 
Agreement)
• The  BSF  (Bootstrapping  Server  Function):  participates  in  the  GBA  through  mutually 
authenticating with the UE using the AKA protocol, and agreeing on session keys that are 
afterwards applied between UE and the NAF.
• The  NAF  (Network  Authentication  Function):  has  the  functionality  of  locating  and 
communicating securely with subscriber’s BSF
• The HSS (Home Subscriber Server): is the master database of IMS that stores IMS user 
profiles.
2.1. Subscribers Identification in IMS
There are two types of identities that are associated with an IMS user. 
1. A private  identity  (IMPI),  where  every IMS user  shall  have one or  more  Private  User 
Identities, but there is only one private user identity stored in each ISIM card. The private 
identity  is  assigned  by  the  home  network  operator,  and  is  used  for  registration, 
authentication,  authorization,  administration,  and  accounting  purposes.  The  private  user 
identity takes the form of a Network Access Identifier (NAI). 
2. A public identity (IMPU) where every IMS user shall have one or more Public User 
Identities  and each ISIM card stores  at  least  one public  user  identity.  The Public  User 
Identities are used by any user for requesting communications to other users and to services 
access. The Public User Identity takes the form of a SIP URI or the "tel:"-URI format.
2.2. Bootstrapping Authentication Procedure
In order to allow the access to services over HTTP in a secure manner, IMS uses the Generic 
Bootstrapping  Architecture  (GBA)  [9].  The  GBA  performs  authentication  between  the 
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Bootstrapping Server Function (BSF) and the UE, which is also based on AKA. Figure 1 shows 
the GBA authentication for services access in IMS.
Figure 1:  GBA Authentication
Before the service access, the UE communicates with the NAF to verify if the bootstrapping 
procedure is needed (message 1). If it is the case and if there are no available bootstrapping 
parameters in the UE (message 2), the UE will contact the BSF by sending an HTTP request 
including the private user identity (message 3). Then, the BSF contacts the HSS to get the GBA 
User  Security Setting  (GUSS)  and  the  Authentication Vector  (AV)  which includes  RAND, 
AUTN, CK, IK and XRES (messages 4-5).
In order to demand the UE to authenticate itself, the BSF then forwards the RAND and AUTN 
to  the  UE  in  a  “401  (Unauthorized)  message”  without  including  the  CK,  IK  and  XRES 
(message  6).  The UE then checks AUTN (following the  same  procedure  described in  IMS 
authentication) to verify that the challenge is from an authorized network; and calculates CK, IK 
and RES. This will result in session keys IK and CK in both BSF and UE.
The UE sends another HTTP request to the BSF, containing the Digest AKA response which is 
calculated using RES (message 7). 
The  BSF  authenticates  the  UE  by  verifying  the  Digest  AKA  response  and  generates  key 
material  Ks  by  concatenating  CK  and  IK.  The  BSF  also  generates  B-TID (Bootstrapping 
Transaction  Identifier)  and  sends a  “200  OK message”,  including the  B-TID to  the  UE to 
indicate the success of the authentication (message 8).
The UE uses CK and IK to calculate the key material Ks and both the UE and BSF use the Ks to 
derive the key material Ks-NAF. The UE contacts the NAF and provides the B-TID and a digest 
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calculated using Ks_NAF (message 9). The NAF then requests the corresponding Ks_NAF and 
GUSS from the BSF by sending B-TID (message 10).
After  receiving the BSF response (message 11), the NAF calculates the digest values using 
Ks_NAF and compares the calculated values with the received ones from the UE to be able to 
authenticate the UE (message 12).
We notice that the BSF is the entity which communicates with all the other entities and has the 
important  role to  verify the UE’s  signatures.  In  real  cases,  there will  be simultaneous UEs 
requesting for authentication and this will lead to a potential bottleneck of signature verification 
at the BSF.
3. OVERVIEW ON IDENTITY BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY IBC
The Identity Based cryptography (IBC) has emerged as a long-term evolution or substitution to 
Public Key Infrastructure PKI. It is a cryptosystem in which the public key is retrieved from an 
identity of the entity (user) and the private key is more precisely the public key multiplied by 
the secret key of the server. The latter is responsible of the private key distribution and is called 
the Private Key Generator (PKG).
The IBC concept is old and was first  proposed by Shamir in 1984 [11], then the first  fully 
practical and secure identity-based public key encryption scheme was presented by D. Boneh 
and M. Franklin in [8], using the fundamental operations of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). 
Since then, a rapid development of Identity based cryptosystems has taken place. 
The IBC is based on the bilinear pairing which is presented later.
Shamir's  original  motivation  for  identity-based  encryption  was  to  simplify  the  certificate 
management in e-mail systems. This solution is illustrated in Figure 2. 
Figure 2:  IBC in mail scenario
3.1. Bilinear Pairings 
Let (G1; +) and (G2; .) be two cyclic groups of prime order q. G1 is an additive group and G2 as a 
multiplicative group.  The bilinear pairing is  given as e:  G1 * G1  G2,  which satisfies the 
following properties:
1. Bilinearity: 
For all P; Q, R ∈  G1; e(P + Q, R) = e(P, R). e(Q, R) and e(P, Q + R) = e(P, Q). e(P, R);
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2. Non-degeneracy: There exists P; Q ∈ G1 such that e(P, Q) ≠ 1;
3. Computability: It is efficient to compute e(P, Q) ∀P; Q ∈  G1.
A bilinear map satisfying the three properties above can be considered as an admissible bilinear 
map [8].
3.2. IBC basic Functions
In IBC, the public key is usually related to the public identity of the user (for example, email 
addressee). The following functional aspects are always present in any IBC cryptosystem. 
1. System  Setup:  IBC  systems  rely  on  a  trusted  central  authority  that  manages  the 
parameters with which keys are created. This authority is called the Private Key Generator 
(PKG). The PKG creates its parameters, including a master secret S used to generate the 
private keys for users. The system parameters are: the order q, the prime number p, the 
generator point P, PKG public point Ppub= S.P and the hash functions.
2. Encryption: When a user (Alice) wishes to send an encrypted message to another user 
(Bob), she encrypts the message to him by computing or obtaining the public key, KpubBob, 
and then encrypting a plaintext message M with KpubBob to obtain cipher message C.
3. Key  Extraction:  When  Bob  receives  the  message,  he  wants  to  decrypt  it.  He 
authenticates himself to the PKG and obtains the secret key KprivBob that he uses to decrypt 
the cipher message C.
4. Decryption: When Bob receives KprivBob, he decrypts the cipher message C to obtain the 
plaintext message M.
3.3. Batch Verification Scheme
In some architectures we need to verify a signature to authenticate the users, where the party 
concerned by the verification presents a bottleneck in the system if the load is high (case of 
many users asking for authentication). One solution is the Batch verification which consists on 
the verification of all the signatures received in a time window with rather short time compared 
to verifying each signature one after  the other.  The batch cryptography based on RSA was 
introduced by Fiat [12] in 1989. Some other batch signature schemes were proposed later like 
[13]. 
Zhang et al [14] used 3 pairing operations to verify a single signature. To verify n signatures, 
they  needed  3  pairing  operations  instead  of  3n  pairing  operations.  In  other  words,  the 
verification  time  of  the  dominant  operation  (i.e.,  pairing)  is  independent  of  the  number  of 
signatures to verify [14]. As a result, the time spent on verifying a large number of signatures 
will be decreased. 
4. PROPOSED IMS SERVICE AUTHENTICATION BASED ON IBC
In this section, we describe our novel solution which uses IBC in the IMS GBA authentication 
to generate the private keys of the UE instead of using AKA mechanisms. Our objective is to 
personalize the IMS service authentication process through using IMPU. This new scheme will 
lead to better performances when there are simultaneous authentication requests thanks to using 
Identity-based Batch Verification.
The HSS has a PKG server which has the role to generate the private keys for the UE. We use 
bilinear map e: e: G1 * G1  G2. The PKG randomly chooses s1, s2 ∈  Z*q as its two master 
keys, and computes Ppub1 = s1.P, Ppub2 = s2.P as its public keys.
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In our work, we assume that the UE has the shared key sk with HSS and the PKG parameters 
(order q, prime number p, P, Ppub1, Ppub2 and MapToPoint function) stored in the ISIM card.
We present in Table 1, all the notation used in the solution.
Table 1.  Notations
Notation Descriptions
UEi
G1
G2
P
e
q
r
s1, s2
Ppub1, Ppub2
H(.)
UEID
Kpubi1, Kpubi2
SKi1, SKi2
RANDi
h(.)
||
The ith UE: User Equipment
A cyclic additive group
A cyclic multiplicative group
The generator of the cyclic additive group G1
A bilinear map: G1 × G1 → G2
The order of the group G1
A random nonce
The private master keys of the PKG
The public keys of the PKG, Ppub1 = s1.P and Pub2= s2.P
A MapToPoint hash [8] function such as H : {0, 1}* → G
UEID = H(IMPU)
The public keys of the UEi
The private keys of UEi, SKi1 = s1.Ppub1 and SKi2 = s2.Ppub2
Random value to authenticate UEi
A one-way hash function such that SHA-1
Message  concatenation  operation,  which  appends  several  messages  together  in  a 
special format
4.1. Description of the solution 
The proposed solution is  explained in the following steps.  In Figure 3, we illustrate all  the 
messages exchanged to authenticate the ith UE (UEi).
Step 1. (messages 1 and 2) UEi starts communication with the NAF without GBA parameters. If 
the NAF requires the use of shared keys obtained by means of the GBA, but the request from 
the  UE  does  not  include  GBA-related  parameters,  the  NAF  replies  with  a  bootstrapping 
initiation message.
Step 2. (messages 3, 4 and 5) UEi sends a HTTP request to the BSF (Bootstrapping Server 
Function) including its IMS private user identity (IMPIi) and public user identity (IMPUi). The 
BSF then retrieves from the HSS:
1. the public keys Kpubi1and Kpubi2 (generated using IMPUi) from the PKG.
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Kpubi1 = r. P and Kpubi2 = UEID ⊕ H(r.Ppub1)
where r is a random number, ⊕ XOR operation and UEID = H(IMPUi)
2. the complete set of GBA user security settings (GUSSi),
3. an Authentication Vector (AVi) containing the RANDi and PKG parameters,
4. the private keys Kprivi1and Kprivi2 encrypted with shared key sk where
Kprivi1 = s1. Kpubi1 and Kprivi2 = s2 . H(Kpubi1 || Kpubi2)
Step 3. (message 6) In order to demand the UEi to authenticate itself, the BSF forwards Kpubi1, 
Kpubi2, [Kprivi1]sk and [Kprivi2]sk and RANDi to the UE in the “401 (Unauthorized) message”.
Step 4. (message 7) The UEi extracts its private keys Kprivi1and Kprivi2 using the shared key sk 
which is stored in the ISIM card. Then, the UEi hashes the RANDi and computes the signature 
Sigi1 where: Sigi1 = Kprivi1 + h(RANDi) . Kprivi2
The UEi sends  IMPUi,  RANDi,  Sigi1 to  the  BSF in  an  HTTP request.  To  verify  the  UEi's 
signature, the BSF has already the PKG parameters and Kpubi1and Kpubi2 corresponding to 
IMPUi. Sigi1 is valid if
e(Sigi1, P) = e(Kpubi1, Ppub1) . e(h(RANDi). H(Kpubi1 || Kpubi2), Ppub2) (1)
If the verification phase is successful, then, the user is authenticated. This is how equation 1 is 
computed:
e(Sigi1, P) = e(Kprivi1 + h(RANDi) . Kprivi2, P)
= e(Kprivi1, P) . e(h(RANDi).Kprivi2, P)
= e(s1.Kpubi1, P) . e(h(RANDi).s2.H(Kpubi1 || Kpubi2), P)
= e(Kpubi1, s1.P) . e(h(RANDi).H(Kpubi1 || Kpubi2), s2.P)
= e(Kpubi1, Ppub1) . e(h(RANDi).H(Kpubi1 || Kpubi2), Ppub2)
Step 5. (message 8) After the successful verification, the BSF generates B-TIDi (Bootstrapping 
ID)  and stores  it  with  the  IMPUi and GUSSi.  Then,  the  BSF sends to  the  UE a  “200 OK 
message”  including  the  B-TIDi encrypted  with  UEi’s  public  key  kpubi1 (BSF can  use  any 
asymmetric elliptic curve algorithm). After receiving the message, the UE retrieves the B-TID 
using Kprivi1.
In our solution, there is no key material Ks stored in the UE and the BSF. Our system is based 
on asymmetric cryptography. The shared key sk between the UEi and the HSS is used to encrypt 
the UEi’s Kprivi1and Kprivi2. The BSF cannot retrieve these keys and has to encrypt B-TIDi 
using UEi’s kpubi1.
Step 6. (message 9) The following steps apply Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) Protocol. 
This key agreement protocol will be used to generate the Ks-NAF key. The UEi and the NAF 
first have to agree whether to use the shared keys obtained by means of the GBA. The UEi 
chooses a random value 'a' to generate 'a. Kpubi1' and provide the IMPUi, B-TIDi, ‘a. Kpubi1’, 
and a signature of B-TIDi to the NAF to allow it to retrieve the corresponding keys from the 
BSF. The Signature of BTIDi is: Sigi2 = Kprivi1 + h(B-TIDi) . Kprivi2
Step 7. (message 10) The NAF sends to the BSF the NAF-ID, the IMPUi, B-TIDi and Sigi2 to 
request for GUSSi and PKG parameters. NAF-ID is used by the BSF to verify that the NAF is 
authorized to use that hostname.
Step 8. (message 11) First of all, the BSF verifies the signature using Kpubi1and Kpubi2  (same 
verification as in step 4, equation (1)). Then, it retrieves the GUSSi and PKG parameters using 
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B-TIDi and IMPUi. Finally, it supplies to the NAF the IMPUi, Kpubi1  and Kpubi2, GUSSi, and 
the PKG parameters. 
Step 9. (message 12) The NAF checks the authentication and the authorization of the UEi to the 
services according to the received GUSSi and then generates a random value ‘b’ and send to the 
UEi ‘b. Kpubi1’. After receiving the message, the UEi and the NAF will have the same Ks-NAF 
= a.b.Kpubi1.  Once the  execution of  the  protocol  is  completed,  the  UEi and the  NAF will 
communicate in a secure way and UEi will be granted the services.
Figure 3.  IMS Service Authentication for the ith UE
4.4. Batch Verification
To verify Sigi1 and Sigi2, the BSF needs one MapToPoint hash (H), one multiplication, and three 
pairing operations. We estimate that the computation cost of a pairing operation is much higher 
than the cost of a MapToPoint hash and a multiplication operation.
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We suppose that we have n UEs which belong to the same HSS and communicate through the 
same BSF. The latter will receive (IMPU1, RAND1, Sig1j), (IMPU2, RAND2, Sig2j), ..., (IMPUn, 
RANDn, Signj), respectively, which are sent by n distinct UEs UE1, UE2, … UEn and j= 1 or 2. 
We just focus in this paragraph on j = 1 because it is respectively the same for j = 2. All the 
signatures, denoted Sig11, Sig21, …, Sign1, are valid if 
e(∑
=
n
i 1
Sigi1, P) = e(∑
=
n
i 1
Kpubi1, Ppub1) . e(∑
=
n
i 1
h(RANDi). H(Kpubi1 || Kpubi2), Ppub2) 
(2)
We proceed like this to give the details of equation 2:
e(∑
=
n
i 1
Sigi1, P) =e(∑
=
n
i 1
(Kprivi1 + h(RANDi) . Kprivi2), P) 
= e(∑
=
n
i 1
Kprivi1, P) . e(∑
=
n
i 1
h(RANDi).Kprivi2, P)
= e(∑
=
n
i 1
s1.Kpubi1, P) . e(∑
=
n
i 1
h(RANDi).s2.H(Kpubi1 || Kpubi2), P)
= e(∑
=
n
i 1
Kpubi1, s1.P) . e(∑
=
n
i 1
h(RANDi).H(Kpubi1 || Kpubi2), s2.P)
= e(∑
=
n
i 1
Kpubi1, Ppub1) . e(∑
=
n
i 1
h(RANDi).H(Kpubi1 || Kpubi2), Ppub2)
4.2. Advantages of the proposed solution
Our proposed solution has a number of advantages as follows:
1. The  applied  batch  verification  can  dramatically  reduce  the  verification  delay, 
particularly  when  verifying  a  large  number  of  signatures.  From  the  batch  verification 
equation  (2),  the  computation  cost  that  the  BSF  spends  on  verifying  n  signatures  is 
dominantly  comprised  of  n  MapToPoint  hash,  n  multiplication,  3n addition,  n  one-way 
hash,  and  3 pairing operations.  Without  the  batch  verification we  will  have  3n pairing 
operations to realize. 
2. Our  proposed  solution  doesn’t  use  AKA-MD5  in  the  GBA  and  provides  more 
simplicity since it is based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). Therefore, it is more 
efficient and preferable in the applications that require low memory and rapid transaction. 
Furthermore,  for  elliptic-curve-based  protocols,  it  is  assumed  that  finding  the  discrete 
logarithm of an elliptic curve element is infeasible.
3. Our system is based on asymmetric cryptography, where the shared key ks between the 
UE and the HSS is used to encrypt the UE’s private keys. We don’t need to have mutual 
authentication with the BSF. The latter cannot retrieve these keys and has to encrypt B-TID 
using UE’s Kpub1. Then, even if there is no mutual authentication between the UE and the 
BSF, security will be always guaranteed.
5. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The UE based frauds lead to illegitimate use of IMS services with stolen credentials. In the 
following, we analyze the Eavesdropping attack and we show the robustness of our proposed 
solution against this attack. In our point of view, it is the most common attack on IMS. We also 
explain how the message authentication is secure. All the messages used in this section are the 
ones illustrated in Figure 3. 
5.1. Eavesdropping Attack
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During the authentication phase (messages 3 to 8), a malicious user can play the role of a Man 
in the Middle (MITM), listens to the communication and retrieves the GUSS related to the IMPI 
and IMPU of the legitimate user. The malicious user then tries to connect to the system using 
his ISIM card (containing his private identity IMPI’ and the legitimate’s IMPU). The HSS will 
reject the request because it doesn’t have the couple (IMPI’, IMPU) in its database. 
5.2. Message Authentication.
In the proposed scheme, the signature Sig1 = Kpriv1 + h(RAND) . Kpriv2 is actually a one-time 
identity based signature (for each authentication, the HSS chooses a different random number r). 
Without knowing the private key Kpriv1 and Kpriv2, it is infeasible to forge a valid signature. 
Because of the NP-hard computation complexity of Diffie-Hellman problem in G, it is difficult 
to derive the private keys Kpriv1 and Kpriv2 by using Kpub1, Ppub1, P, and H(Kpubi1 || Kpubi2). 
At the same time, because Sig1 or Sig2 is a Diophantine equation [14], by only knowing Sig1 and 
h(RAND) (or Sig2 and h(B-TID)), it is still difficult to get the private keys. Therefore, the one-
time identity-based signature is unforgeable, and the property of message authentication is fully 
satisfied.
6. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In  this  section,  we  evaluate  the  performance  of  the  novel  proposed  solution  especially  for 
verifying the delay caused by the BSF. We believe that IBC performance is the most critical 
point that can judge the feasibility of deploying our solution, and the measures that we got are 
not discouraging especially with the use of Batch Verification.
For the whole scenario, the most important parameter influencing the performance will be the 
speed  of  the  cryptographic  operations  (such  as  private/public  key  pair  generation, 
encryption/decryption, and signature/verification time). In this performance analysis, we mainly 
measure the speed of the cryptographic operations, without considering the underlying network 
architecture  at  this  phase.  We  estimate  that  the  BSF will  be  the  bottleneck  of  the  service 
authentication process since it processes many HTTP messages and has the important role to 
verify the UE’s signatures.
We notice the existence of IMS platforms [15] however without any implementation of the 
GBA Authentication for services access that why we need to implement our own testbed. We 
implemented  the  PKG,  which  is  found  within  the  HSS,  through employing  the  IBE demo 
provided within Miracl library [16]. We use the elliptic curve y2 = x3 + 1 mod p where p is 256 
bits prime number. 
In the following, all the measures are real measures from the implementation realized using an 
Intel® Core ™2 CPU T5470 @ 1,60GHZ. We observed that the time needed to generate PKG 
parameters (160 bits q, 256 bits q, 512 bits point P, 512 Point Ppub, 160 bits secret S and 512 
bits  cube root  of  unity in  Fp2)  is  around 14 ms.  To generate  Kpub1 and Kpub2,  we use  a 
MapToPoint function, which has the role of finding a point in the curve corresponding to the 
Hash of the IMPU. We found that the time needed for MapToPoint Tmtp will be in the order of 
4,4 ms.  To generate Kpriv1 and Kpriv2,  the PKG needs almost  7,5ms.  The time needed for 
bilinear pairing Tbp is about 9,3 ms and the time for multiplication Tmul is about 1,5 ms.
For  the  verification  of  Sig1 or  Sig2,  we  need  3  bilinear  pairings,  1  MapToPoint  and  1 
multiplication, so for 1 person Tv = 3 Tbp  +  Tmtp  +  Tmul ≈ 33,8 ms.  The BSF has a maximum 
capacity, we note as N. If we have more than N UEs simultaneously requesting authentication, 
the system will reject or delay the answer. With the Batch Verification, this can be avoided 
since  the  verification  for  n  signature  will  cost  3  bilinear  pairings,  n  MapToPoint  and  n 
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multiplication. Table 2 shows the time needed that we deduced for different number of UEs (we 
choose N >=1000 UEs).
From the performance point of view, the asymmetric system seems to need more time to finish 
all operations than symmetric one but this is not harmful to our work. Furthermore, from the 
security point of view, the identity Based Cryptography IBC is more secure (using 160 key 
instead of 128 key for AKA) and we calculated that we need about 4 min to authenticate 50000 
UEs, and it seams to be an encouraging result.
Table.2  Time needed to authenticate all the UEs
Verification method
Number of UEs
Without  Batch
Verification (s)
With Batch
Verification
1000 33,8s ~ 5,9 s
5000 169 s ~ 29,5
10000 338 s ~ 59 s
50000 1690 s ~ 295 s
7. CONCLUSION
IP  Multimedia  Subsystem  (IMS)  merges  the  internet  with  the  cellular  world  to  provide 
ubiquitous access to internet technologies and to provide consumers with appealing services. 
IMS authentication falls short in one hand to be realized in a personalized manner, which is an 
important prerequisite in new services such as social internet ones. On the other hand, using 
AKA in IMS proved to have some weakness, like short key for cryptographic purposes. In this 
paper, we integrate the Identity Based Cryptography (IBC) in the IMS Service Authentication 
scheme. Since IBC is based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), it is more efficient and 
preferable in the applications that require low memory and rapid transaction. Security is assured 
thanks to using of symmetric protocol with a shared key (ks) between the UE and the HSS, an 
asymmetric protocol for signature, and Diffie-Hellman for key agreement. We define a Batch 
Verification on the Bootstrapping Server Function BSF to decrease verification delay and the 
authentication  response  time.  We  analyzed  some  security  aspects  of  the  solutions  and  we 
showed that our proposed solution can prevent against the attacks. To validate the performance 
of our proposed solution, we implemented the cryptographic operation in our proposed solution 
including the IBC procedures. We observe that the use of asymmetric cryptographic procedures 
will lead to longer running time than symmetric procedures. However, the Batch Verification 
helps the BSF to verify the UEs signature in a reasonable time. As a future work, we need to 
improve our testbed by integrating it to an IMS core for a complete authentication session and 
to perform tests in realistic network conditions. 
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